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Abstract
There is a vast academic literature on the moral dimensions and ethical dilemmas of what are
commonly referred to as the helping professions, (e.g. nursing, medicine, social work,
counseling, teaching, etc.). Over the past several decades, increasing attention has been paid to
the issue of moral transgressions perpetrated, witnessed, or experienced by these professionals
and their accompanying psychological and social outcomes. Scholars seeking to understand
moral transgressions and their effects have proposed and examined a variety of constructs,
including moral distress, demoralization, and moral injury. This article examines to what extent
constructs related to moral transgressions and their associated psychological, emotional, and
social effects overlap and diverge to describe similar and/or distinct phenomena and proposes a
unified conceptual model of moral suffering. Understanding the moral dimensions of the helping
professions is critical for effective research and just, ethical practice.
[Key words: demoralization; helping professionals; moral distress; moral injury]
Introduction
Professions that are geared toward caring for and aiding the physical, mental, emotional, or
spiritual well-being of others, including teaching, social work, counseling, nursing, medicine,
and ministry, are commonly referred to as the helping professions (Esterson 1982; Hawkins et al.
2012). The term “helping” suggests a core value of altruism that is shared across these different
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specialized professions. Skorupski (1998) defines morality as “that set of convictions whose
function is to promote human flourishing, to enable us to live together on terms of mutually
beneficial cooperation” (sec. 2, para. 1). Therefore, the helping professions are, to some degree,
shaped in moral terms. In addition to having an identity rooted in morality, many of the helping
professions, including social work (National Association of Social Work 2017), psychology
(American Psychological Association 2017), nursing (American Nurses Association 2015), and
medicine (AMA Council of Ethical and Judicial Affairs 2016), are guided by formal codes of
ethics, which provide standards for professional behavior and outline the core beliefs, values, and
moral principles to which all professionals are expected to adhere. Even for helping professions
that lack a formal, nationally adopted code of ethics, like teaching, ethical codes have been
established by national unions (National Education Association 1975) and state-level licensing
boards (e.g., Code of Ethics for Minnesota Teachers, Minnesota Administrative Rules
8710.2100).
The academic literature on the moral dimensions and ethical dilemmas of the helping
professions is vast (e.g., Jameton 1984; Goodlad, Soder, and Sirotnik 1991; Carr 2000; Campbell
2003; Strike and Soltis 2009; Reamer 2013). One area of the literature on morality in the helping
professions that has garnered increasing attention in the 21st century concerns moral
transgressions that are perpetrated, witnessed, or experienced by professionals, along with the
accompanying psychological and social outcomes. Scholars seeking to understand moral
transgressions and their effects have proposed and examined a variety of constructs, including
moral injury (Shay 1994, 2014; Litz et al. 2009), moral distress (Jameton 1984, 1993), and
demoralization (Gabel 2011, 2012, 2013; Santoro 2011). Because these constructs (which will
be described in depth in the next section) appear to address the influence of potentially morally
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transgressive events on a helping professional’s psychological, emotional, and social well-being,
questions arise as to what distinguishes them from each other. Are these constructs describing
the same phenomena but employing different terms, depending on the academic and professional
discipline? Are they describing related but distinct phenomena with clear conceptual
boundaries? If the constructs relate to each other, how are they related?
Understanding the moral dimensions of the helping professions and their practice
contexts, particularly in terms of the sources and outcomes of moral violations, is critical for
promoting just and ethical care and positive outcomes for recipients. To increase this
understanding, it is necessary to have conceptual clarity in order to develop applicable theoretical
models that can be used to guide research and practice. This article answers the following
question: To what extent do constructs related to moral transgressions and their associated
psychological, emotional, and social effects overlap and diverge to describe similar and/or
distinct phenomena? A broader conceptual understanding of these constructs and how they
relate to one another will allow for more effective research into the moral actions, transgressions,
and outcomes across the helping professions. In the next section, I summarize the existing
literature on each of the following constructs: moral injury, moral distress, and demoralization.
Following these summaries, I present an analysis of the areas of similarity and divergence among
the constructs and then present a proposed integrated model of moral suffering. The article ends
with a discussion of the significance of moral suffering to social work practice and research.
The Constructs
MORAL INJURY
Moral injury refers to the lasting emotional, psychological, and existential harm that occurs when
an individual “perpetrates, fails to prevent, bears witness to, or learns about acts that transgress
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deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” (Litz et al. 2009, 700). Moral injury occurs when an
individual experiences deeply troubling cognitive dissonance between their internal moral code
and the actions that they engage in or witness (Litz et al. 2009). Symptoms of moral injury
include guilt, shame, anxiety, depression, and anger (Litz et al. 2009; Dombo, Gray, and Early
2013; Jinkerson 2016) and can lead to a loss of trust in oneself or others, existential dread, and
deep demoralization (Jinkerson 2016). The symptoms of moral injury can be long-lasting, do not
resolve easily on their own, and are often resistant to typical psychological treatments for trauma
(Litz et al. 2009). The damage to one’s internal moral schema or moral belief system is a
particularly significant outcome of moral injury that can lead to irreparable change in an
individual’s self-identity (Dombo et al. 2013). Moral injury causes a “disruption in an
individual’s confidence and expectations about one’s own or others’ motivation or capacity to
behave in a just and ethical manner” (Drescher et al. 2011, 9), and a “breakdown in global
meaning” (Currier et al. 2015, 26).
Jonathan Shay, a military psychiatrist (1994, 2009, 2011, 2014), first used the term moral
injury, and the vast majority of research on moral injury has occurred within the military context.
Although the military is not traditionally considered to be a helping profession, it operates from a
strong moral code and has a focus on self-sacrifice and helping others gain freedom, liberty, and
safety. This can be viewed as a type of caring and altruism, and thus, for the purposes of this
article, the military will be considered a helping profession. Many participants who have
reported experiencing moral injury also have a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD; Haight et al. 2016); however, scholars insist that moral injury, though it may occur
concurrently with PTSD, is a distinct condition (Litz et al. 2009; Dombo et al. 2013; Shay 2014).
In PTSD, traumatic events threaten one’s safety and mortality; in moral injury, the troubling act
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threatens the validity of one’s internal moral framework (Dombo et al. 2013). Although research
on moral injury has occurred predominantly in military contexts, an increasing number of
researchers have empirically explored the applicability of moral injury to other populations, such
as refugees (Nickerson et al. 2015), teachers in El Salvador (Currier et al. 2015), women with
substance abuse histories (Hartman 2015), women who have experienced intimate partner
violence (Otte 2015), police officers (Papazoglou and Chopko 2017), parents and professionals
involved in the child protection system (Haight, Sugrue, and Calhoun 2017; Haight, Sugrue,
Calhoun, and Black 2017a, 2017b), and professionals in the US K12 education system (Sugrue,
under review).
MORAL DISTRESS
The term moral distress was first coined by nursing ethicist Andrew Jameton (1984), and it
refers to the “painful feelings and/or the psychological disequilibrium that occurs when nurses
are conscious of the morally appropriate action a situation requires, but cannot carry out that
action” (Corley 2002, 636-637) due either to internal constraints (e.g., fear) or external
constraints (e.g., lack of time, lack of resources, legal limits, hierarchical decision-making;
Corley 2002; McCarthy and Deady 2008). Individuals experience moral distress when “they
know the right thing to do, but they are unable to do it; or they do what they believe is the wrong
thing to do” (McCarthy and Deady 2008, 254). In 1993, Jameton refined his theory to
distinguish between initial moral distress and reactive moral distress. Initial moral distress
refers to the emotional reaction (e.g., frustration, anger, and anxiety) experienced when one is
confronted with a conflict between one’s moral values and available actions, while reactive
moral distress refers to the lasting distress individuals experience after not acting in a way that is
consistent with their moral values (Jameton 1993). Symptoms of moral distress include anger,
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frustration, guilt, shame, anxiety, loss of self worth, depression, and powerlessness (Corley
2002). Research finds that nurses cope with moral distress by avoiding patient interaction
(Raines 2000; Corley 2002; McCarthy and Deady 2008), abandoning their moral principles all
together (Webster and Baylis 2000; Hamric 2012), or leaving the profession (Corley 2002;
McCarthy and Deady 2008; Hamric 2012).
Jameton (1984) distinguishes between moral uncertainty, in which individuals are unsure
about the right action to take, and moral distress, in which individuals know what to do but are
unable to do it. McCarthy and Deady (2008) clarify that moral distress goes beyond emotional
or psychological distress. For example, a nurse could be emotionally distressed when
performing a work task, such as restraining a patient, but not morally distressed if the nurse
believed the restraint was the right thing to do (McCarthy and Deady 2008). Additionally,
Weinberg (2009) argues that moral distress is distinct from an ethical dilemma. While ethical
dilemmas are conceptualized as problems at the individual level, the conceptualization of moral
distress acknowledges the role of larger systems including “political dimensions of practices,
thereby enabling structural issues to be recast as ethical problems” (Lynch and Forde 2016, 96)
Moral distress has received significant attention in the academic literature, both
conceptually and empirically, but the research has been primarily confined to the field of
nursing. A Scopus search conducted on January 14, 2018 found 784 articles on moral distress
published between 1987 and 2018. All but four of the articles were published in nursing or other
medical journals. Despite the substantial body of literature on moral distress, there has been
some uncertainty over the specifics of its definition (McCarthy and Deady 2008; Dudzinski
2016). Dudzinski (2016) states that the exact definition and meaning of moral distress “is
famously nebulous" (321). Some scholars choose to focus on the role of external social and
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institutional constraints in eliciting moral distress (e.g. Jameton 1984, 1993; Corley 2002), while
others include the role of internal constraints (Webster and Baylis 2000). Hanna (2004) argues
that some scholars (e.g., Jameton 1984, 1993; Wilkinson 1988) focus too much on the
psychological aspects of moral distress, to the point that they are conflating psychological
distress with moral distress and ignoring the more salient ethical components of the phenomena.
In response to this conceptual muddiness, McCarthy and Deady (2008) propose that moral
distress should be considered “a cluster concept or umbrella concept” (259) capturing a range of
symptoms and experiences of individuals who are morally constrained.
Not only has the majority of research on moral distress occurred in nursing contexts, but
it has occurred specifically in North American nursing contexts (Pauly, Varcoe, and Storch
2012). Interestingly, in Scandinavia, there is a body of work within nursing literature that uses
different terms, such as “moral stress” (Lützén et al. 2003) and “troubled conscience” (Glasberg
et al. 2006), for what appears to be moral distress. In this literature, “moral stress” refers to the
emotional experience that occurs “when nurses are aware of what ethical principles are at stake
in a specific situation and external factors prevent them from making a decision that would
reduce the conflict between the contradicting principles” (Lutzen et al. 2003, 314). “Troubled
conscience,” as explained by Ann-Louise Glasberg and colleagues (2006), stems from the
discrepancy that arises among one’s internal conscience or “voice,” internal desires or
inclinations, and external demands when an individual “does not follow the voice of conscience”
(635). Some of the differences between moral distress and its counterparts in the Scandinavian
literature could be due to translation alone, but an integration of the North American and
European constructs could help to clarify moral distress’s conceptual ambiguity (Pauly et al.
2012).
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Recently, some scholars have pushed back against Jameton’s (1984, 1993) assertion that
moral distress must involve a situation of moral constraint (Johnstone and Hutchinson 2015;
Campbell, Ulrich, and Grady 2016; Fourie 2017). Johnstone and Hutchinson (2015) argue that
the dominant conceptualization of moral distress is based on the flawed assumption that nurses
always know the right thing to do and the only reason they are not doing the right thing is
because they are unable to, due to internal or external constraints. The authors assert that to
assume “the unequivocal correctness and justification of nurses’ moral judgments” (8) is a
fallacy and this conceptualization of moral distress “understates the moral responsibility of
nurses to take remedial action, even in difficult environments, and thus risks being apologist for
their incapacities” (8). Similarly, Campbell and colleagues (2016) point out that “life as a moral
agent is complex” (3), and that frequently it is difficult if not impossible for nurses to know the
correct moral action to take. In contrast to Jameton (1984), who distinguishes between moral
dilemmas (which are a source of moral distress) and moral uncertainty (which is not), Campbell
and colleagues assert (2016) that both moral dilemmas and moral uncertainty can lead to moral
distress. Fourie (2017) proposes that moral distress is comprised of multiple categories,
including the constraint-based moral distress as defined by Jameton (1984, 1993) and the
uncertainty-based moral distress as identified by Campbell and colleagues (2016).
DEMORALIZATION
Demoralization is a construct that is used to describe “feelings of impotence, isolation, and
despair” (Clarke and Kissane 2002, 734) in response to a perceived inability to deal effectively
with a stressful experience (Clarke and Kissane 2002). Demoralization is related to both an
individual's moral beliefs and actions and with a loss of morale when important beliefs and
values are lost (Gabel 2013). When individuals are demoralized, they feel trapped, helpless, and
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unable to respond to a stressful situation in a way that feels appropriate to them, all of which
results in feelings of anxiety, depression, and “a sense of meaninglessness of life” (Clarke and
Kissane 2002, 734).
Stewart Gabel (2011, 2012, 2013) has examined demoralization in the context of
healthcare professionals and defines demoralization as “a condition of diminished morale or
hopelessness that occurs when one's principles, values, or standards are threatened" (Gabel 2011,
892). Gabel (2013) argues that medicine and healthcare are rooted in moral beliefs and
practices. Over the centuries, newly graduating physicians have recited oaths and declarations
focused on the common theme of “the obligation of physicians to strive to aid those seeking
help” (Gabel 2013, 119). Demoralization can occur when the moral foundation of healthcare
practice is threatened by a lack of resources, increasing commercialization of healthcare, or
policy changes that limit the ability of professionals to provide the type of care that they feel
morally obligated to provide.
Demoralization has also been applied in the field of education by Santoro (2011), who
defines teacher demoralization as the phenomenon that occurs when a teacher is unable to access
the moral rewards of teaching. Santoro (2011) argues that “morals, values, and principles
comprise the essence of teaching” (4) and “the moral rewards of teaching are activated when
educators feel that they are doing what is right in terms of one's students, the teaching profession,
and themselves” (2). Teacher demoralization happens when teachers lose the ability to act
pedagogically in a way that feels right to them due to being overburdened by policies that are not
consistent with their beliefs and values about their profession (Santoro 2011). Santoro describes
demoralized teachers as feeling “depressed, discouraged, shameful, and hopeless” (Santoro 2011,
18).
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Santoro (2011) cites the hyper-focus on standardized testing after the passage of No
Child Left Behind as a significant source of demoralization for teachers, as they are unable to
exercise their moral agency while operating under policy requirements that dismiss their
pedagogical knowledge, constrain their pedagogical judgment, and restrict their pedagogical
authority (16). When teachers attempt to challenge the policy requirements regarding
standardized testing and measurement, they are characterized as self-serving, lazy, and
incompetent (Santoro 2016). Santoro (2016) introduces the term “moral madness” to refer to the
deep feelings of confusion and disorientation experienced “when a person’s moral claims are not
recognized as moral and the individual is disregarded as a moral agent” (2).
Gabel’s (2011, 2012, 2013) and Santoro’s (2011) work on demoralization in the context
of healthcare professionals and educators, respectively, acknowledges that demoralization is a
contributing factor to the more frequently discussed construct of burnout, but clarifies that the
two are distinct constructs. Maslach, Schaufeli, and Leiter (2001) describe burnout as "a
psychological syndrome in response to chronic interpersonal stressors on the job" (399) that
consists of three dimensions: exhaustion, cynicism/depersonalization, and ineffectiveness
(Maslach and Leiter 1997; Maslach et al. 2001). Gabel (2013) argues that, although
demoralization and burnout share similar symptoms such as anxiety, depression, and feelings of
inefficacy, burnout can be considered primarily “a prolonged reaction to chronic stressors in the
work environment” while demoralization “results from a threat to or loss of personal or
professional values that are perceived to be crucial to an individual's sense of well-being” (122).
Santoro (2011) argues that demoralization, defined as “the inability to access the moral
rewards of teaching” (3), is often “misdiagnosed as burnout” (3). Many researchers of teacher
burnout conceptualize it as a problem related to the characteristics and actions of the individual
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teacher and not to the context in which the teacher operates (Santoro 2011). For example,
teachers who are at most risk of burnout are often described as being overly idealistic and having
difficulty establishing a healthy work-life balance (Farber 2000; Chang 2009). From these
perspectives, burnout is viewed primarily as a condition resulting from the depletion of a
teacher’s internal resources for coping with the job and one that can be avoided with better selfcare (Santoro 2011). In contrast, according to Santoro (2011), demoralization is rooted in the
structure and context of education as a practice. Unlike burnout, demoralization “is not the result
of a lack of personal fortitude or moral sensibility but a fundamental change in the rewards
available through the work” (Santoro 2011, 17).
Discussion
Table 1 provides a summary of the key characteristics of moral injury, moral distress, and
demoralization. The following section presents an integrated analysis of the three constructs.
CONCEPTUAL SIMILARITIES
Whereas research on moral injury has been primarily confined to military contexts, moral
distress to healthcare settings, and demoralization to healthcare and education, there is clear
overlap among the three constructs. All three constructs describe emotional, psychological, and
existential distress related to a violation of moral expectations and deeply held values (Jameton
1984; Webster and Baylis 2000; Litz et al. 2009; Gabel 2011; Shay 2014). Clarke and Kissane’s
(2002) assertion that individuals experience demoralization when “they have lost, or feel they are
losing, something critical to their sense of self” (737) echoes Dombo and colleagues’ (2013)
argument that the core of moral injury is “the threat to self-identity” (207) and Webster and
Baylis’s (2000) description of the permanent change in self-identity that results from experiences
of moral distress.
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Like authors who describe moral injury’s lasting wounds (e.g., Litz et al. 2009), some
scholars of moral distress describe deep wounds and threats to one’s moral integrity that can
occur after violating one’s moral beliefs (Webster and Baylis 2000; McCarthy and Deady 2008).
Webster and Baylis (2000) refer to these lingering feelings of distress as “moral residue.”
Additionally, authors describe how moral distress permanently changes individuals’ sense of
identity and the manner in which they connect with others (Webster and Baylis 2000; Hanna
2004). Webster and Baylis (2000) quote a medical student who experienced moral distress as
saying that, “In the deepest part of yourself, you feel you will never be the same and you carry
this with you for the rest of your life” (224). These types of long-lasting injuries to the self and
resulting existential crises arising from moral distress echo the descriptions of moral injury and
its effects (Shay 1994, 2014; Litz et al. 2009; Drescher et al. 2011; Dombo et al. 2013).
Similarly, the “sense of meaningless of life” that Clarke and Kissane (2002, 734) identify as an
outcome of demoralization appears to be equivalent to the “breakdown in global meaning” (p. 3)
that Joseph Currier and colleagues (2015) attribute to moral injury. In fact, Jinkerson (2016)
points out that, “the final state of moral injury has been described as deep demoralization” (124).
CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES
Despite their having some similarities, there are several clear distinctions among moral injury,
moral distress, and demoralization. Conceptualizations of demoralization and moral distress
focus on the inability of the primary actors to change their circumstances (Jameton 1984, 1993;
Clarke and Kissane 2002; Santoro 2011). In the demoralization literature, this inability is
frequently referred to as “impotence” (Clarke and Kissane 2002), while the moral distress
literature discusses “internal and external constraints” (Jameton 1984, 1993). In both cases, the
results are feelings of helpless and hopelessness as one is unable to respond in a manner that
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feels morally right (Corley 2002; Gabel 2011; Santoro 2011). In contrast, internal or external
constraints, although they may be present, are not required for a person to experience moral
injury. An individual could experience moral injury after having mistakenly or freely
transgressed their moral expectations. The action and one’s interpretation of the action as being
morally transgressive leads to moral injury, regardless of whether or not the action occurred due
to any constraints placed on the individual actor. For example, a military veteran could
experience moral injury after accidentally killing a civilian. In this situation, the veteran may not
have been personally forced to kill the civilian but made a mistake that resulted in the violation
of a deeply held belief about the protection of civilians.
The role of the individual experiencing distress also varies among conceptualizations of
moral injury, moral distress, and demoralization. A person can experience moral injury by
perpetrating a moral transgression and/or witnessing or being the victim of someone else’s
action, if that action was evaluated by the individual as being a violation of deeply held moral
beliefs and expectations (Litz et al. 2009; Shay 2014). In contrast, in demoralization and moral
distress, the source of distress is the individual’s own immoral actions (or inactions) or their own
inability to act in a way that is congruent with their moral beliefs (Clarke and Kissane 2002;
Gabel 2011; Santoro 2011).
EMERGING CONCEPTUAL CONVERGENCE
As I previously stated, in recent years a number of scholars have advocated for broadening the
conceptualization of moral distress (Campbell et al. 2016; Fourie 2017). These broader
conceptualizations have functioned to decrease the distinctions between moral injury and moral
distress. Campbell and colleagues (2016) propose the following definition of moral distress:
“one or more negative self-directed emotions or attitudes that arise in response to one’s
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perceived involvement in a situation that one perceives to be morally undesirable” (6). By
including the phrase “one’s perceived involvement,” Campbell and colleagues (2016) explain
that they are being intentionally vague to allow for a wide range of roles that the individual could
play in relation to the morally troubling event. In this definition, the individual experiencing
moral distress may be the perpetrator of the moral transgression, but also may be “simply
connected, professionally or personally, to others who are more centrally involved in a morally
undesirable situation” (Campbell et al. 2016, 6). This broader conceptualization of the role of
the individual in the moral transgression is similar to that of moral injury, in which the morally
injured person may be the perpetrator, a witness, or a victim of the immoral act.
In addition to broadening the role of the morally distressed individual in the
transgression, Campbell and colleagues (2016) also advocate for broadening the potential
sources of moral distress beyond situations involving moral constraint (Jameton 1984) and moral
uncertainty (Fourie 2017) to include those involving what they term “moral luck.” Campbell and
colleagues (2016) use this term to refer to experiences in which “agents perform what they deem
to be the morally best action based on the best information and evidence available to them at the
time, without any internal or external constraints. Yet, their actions, in conjunction with factors
beyond their control, turn out to have morally undesirable consequences” (5). In response to and
in support of Campbell and colleagues (2016), Andrew McAnich (2016) points out that their
conceptualization of moral distress is “similar to, and perhaps encompasses, another self-directed
negative emotion that is characteristic of a particular domain: namely, moral injury among
combat veterans” (30). A commonly cited event associated with moral injury is the killing of
civilians due to the ambiguity of combatants who are often embedded within civilian
communities (Drescher and Foy 2008; Litz et al. 2009). Consistent with Campbell and
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colleagues’ (2016) description of “moral luck,” this type of morally injurious event can be
characterized as a morally best action that resulted in morally undesirable consequences.
Conceptualizations of moral injury have also moved from the narrow to the broad.
McAnich (2016) notes that Shay’s original definition of moral injury was narrower, with a focus
on the response to a betrayal by a person in authority in high-stakes context (Shay 1994, 2014).
However, Litz and colleagues (2009) broadened this conceptualization to include actions by
peers or the service member himself. Most recently, McDonald (2017) challenged researchers
and clinicians to expand their understanding of the true sources of moral injury. McDonald
(2017) argues that when veterans experience moral injury, they are not solely troubled by what
they or their colleagues did or failed to do, but by “the specter of a world without morals” that
arises when one is confronted with deeply morally troubling events. Experiences of war shatter
long held beliefs in rightness and wrongness and leave individuals facing “a world that has
become morally irreconcilable” (McDonald 2017, 6). According to McDonald (2017), this
destruction of one’s belief in the world as a moral place should be considered the core of moral
injury. Interestingly, McDonald’s (2017) insistence on the significance of moral context as it
relates to an individual’s experience of moral injury is echoed in Santoro’s (2011) writing on
teacher demoralization. Santoro (2011) argues that teachers experience demoralization when
they can no longer access the moral rewards of teaching because the moral context of teaching is
endangered. In Santoro’s (2011) view, it is not the individual characteristics or even the
individual actions of teachers that are the source of demoralization, but it is teaching itself that
has become, in McDonald’s (2017) words, “morally irreconcilable” (6).
PROPOSED INTEGRATED MODEL OF MORAL SUFFERING
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As the conceptualizations of moral injury, moral distress, and demoralization are broadening, the
overlaps that have always existed among these constructs are increasing. These increasing
similarities suggest that an integrated model is both more possible and more necessary. In figure
1, I present a proposed integrated conceptual model that I term moral suffering. This model
captures the key components and overlapping conceptualizations of moral distress,
demoralization, and moral injury. Similar to Litz and colleagues’ (2009) model of moral injury,
the model of moral suffering begins with an experience of dissonance between an individual’s
moral beliefs, values, and expectations and an experience of moral transgression. In this model,
a morally transgressive experience can involve individual immoral actions, similar to those
described by Litz and colleagues (2009) or a more general experience of trying to operate within
an immoral context, echoing McDonald’s (2017) idea that moral injury arises in the face of “the
specter of a world without morals” (6) as well as Santoro’s conceptualization of demoralization
as resulting not from individual immoral actions but from an educational context that is “morally
irreconcilable” (6).
In the proposed model of moral suffering, the relationship between individual immoral
actions and an immoral context is circular and reciprocal; individual immoral actions collectively
produce an immoral context or environment, while an immoral context also produces
individuals’ immoral actions. This model also includes the perspective of more recent
researchers of moral distress (e.g. Johnstone and Hutchinson 2015; Campbell et al. 2016; Fourie
2017) who argue that Jameton’s (1984) assertion that moral distress must involve a situation of
moral constraint, in which an individual knows the right action to take but is unable to take it, is
flawed. In this model of moral suffering, individuals may commit a moral transgression for a
variety of reasons, including because of an internal or external constraint as Jameton (1984)
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proposes, because they are experiencing moral uncertainty and are unsure of what to do as
Campbell and colleagues (2016) propose, because they committed an action and only later
understood its moral implications, or because they accidentally committed a moral transgression.
In this model of moral suffering, I am proposing that how or why a person experiences a moral
transgression is much less important than the resulting moral cognitive dissonance and
accompanying existential and psychological outcomes of this dissonance.
As is illustrated in figure 1, the dissonance resulting from the mismatch between one’s
moral beliefs and morally transgressive experiences leads to the loss of faith in oneself and
others to act morally and the rejection of the belief in the world as moral place. This sense of
moral confusion and betrayal leads to feelings of guilt, shame, anxiety, anger, and depression.
Moral suffering represents the experience of losing one’s moral beliefs and expectations and the
accompanying psychological and emotional symptoms. The experience of moral loss that is at
the core of moral suffering is stressed in the writings of other prominent scholars of moral injury
(e.g. Dombo et al. 2013; Drescher et al. 2011; Currier et al. 2015), moral distress (Webster and
Baylis 2000), and demoralization (Clarke and Kissane 2002; Santoro 2011); although, it is absent
from Litz and colleagues’ (2009) model of moral injury.
This proposed model of moral suffering can be applied across a continuum of severity of
symptoms and across contexts. For example, a military veteran who participated in an operation
in Afghanistan that resulted in the deaths of young children may have more severe psychological
symptoms than a social worker who placed children in a foster home where they experienced
extreme psychological distress and trauma. Yet, both experiences could be described and
explained by this model of moral suffering. Depending on an individual’s moral beliefs and
expectations, their reactions to moral transgressions may vary in severity both within and across
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contexts. However, the underlying mechanisms and resulting symptoms can all be understood
within this model of moral suffering.
An integrated model of moral suffering may be helpful in addressing the siloed nature of
the current literature on the effect of moral transgressions on helping professionals. As is
demonstrated in table 1, most of the constructs have been researched nearly exclusively within
one academic discipline or professional field. In addition, there appears to be very little
communication among the researchers of each individual construct. In Haight and colleagues’
(2016) review of 27 empirical studies on moral injury published between 2011 and 2015, only
four mentioned moral distress and none of the studies examined moral distress and its
relationship to moral injury empirically. The similarities between moral distress and
demoralization, as defined by Gabel (2011, 2012, 2013) and Santoro (2011) are particularly
strong, yet neither researcher mentions moral distress in their work, even though Gabel conducts
research with healthcare providers. The adoption of a unified construct, like that of moral
suffering, could enhance cross-discipline research on the sources of and effects of moral
transgressions in the context of helping professions that could help illuminate not just the
suffering of individual professionals and clients but also the larger political, social, and structural
forces that create situations in which moral transgressions occur. These forces and systems need
attention and action from academics and practitioners in the helping professions, but to address
them effectively we must be able to speak the same language.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE
I conclude with a discussion of the implications of the constructs discussed in this article, and
specifically my proposed model of moral suffering, to social work practice. Despite the
literature on moral injury, moral distress, and demoralization having originated in the fields of
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nursing, military psychology, and medicine and education, respectively, over the past 5–10
years, it has gradually gained attention among social work scholars. Dombo and colleagues
(2013) were the first social work scholars to propose the applicability of moral injury beyond the
military battlefield to understand the suffering experienced by multiple different types of clients
of clinical social work practitioners. Haight and colleagues (2017) find that moral injury could
be a useful construct in understanding and improving the experiences of professionals working in
the child protection system. Illustrating my argument for the significant conceptual overlap
between moral injury and moral distress, Mänttäri-van der Kuip (2016) conducted a similar study
on child welfare social workers in Finland, but applied the construct of moral distress instead of
moral injury, and finds significant evidence of moral distress among this population. Other
studies of moral distress in social work literature have been primarily conducted on hospitalbased social workers (e.g., Lev and Ayalon 2016; Fantus et al. 2017; Fronek et al. 2017), perhaps
due to moral distress’s origins in the field of hospital-based nursing. More broadly, Oliver
(2013), Weinberg (2009), and Lynch and Forde (2016) write convincingly of the need for moral
distress to be a guiding concept in teaching ethics to social work students and in engaging social
work practitioners in ethical practice, as it can reorient our field to the inherently moral nature of
our work and help examine ways to address moral transgressions and injustice.
In making the case for the usefulness of moral suffering as a critical construct for social
work practice, I draw primarily upon Weinberg’s (2009) argument for the usefulness of moral
distress to social work. First, moral suffering highlights the fact that social work practitioners
experience real psychological and existential pain and suffering when they are involved in
actions and environments that violate their moral beliefs and expectations. As a profession,
especially one that is “committed to the psychological health of people” (Weinberg 2009, 146), it
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is ironic that we have not focused more on the negative psychological and social outcomes of
moral suffering for social work practitioners. Attention to moral suffering could aid in
supporting the well-being, effectiveness, and professional retention of social workers with strong
moral codes and a sensitivity toward injustice.
Second, and I would argue more important for social work practice, is the role that moral
suffering can play in drawing attention to the sources of injustice and immorality inherent in the
contexts in which social workers practice. Weinberg (2009) argues that social work ethics have
become too narrowly construed, focused mostly on “the dyadic relationship between worker and
service user” (143), and suggests that moral distress can highlight the connection between
individual social workers and the larger social, political, and economic structures in which they
work. According to the proposed model of moral suffering, if an individual social worker
experiences moral suffering this signifies that moral transgressions are occurring. Most likely,
the victims of these immoral actions and contexts are the individuals and communities who
social workers are charged with helping. Thus, the construct of moral suffering can be used to
identify the structural and systemic sources of injustice and oppression that all social workers, by
nature of our professional code of ethics (National Association of Social Work 2017) and
historical mandate, have a responsibility to address.
Finally, in addition to helping to highlight sources of moral injustice, the application of a
model of moral suffering to social work practice and scholarship can contribute to the
development of effective strategies for responding to these sources of injustice in social work
practice. As many organizations that employ social workers have become increasingly
dominated by neo-liberal and market-driven approaches to social welfare, social workers are
increasingly finding themselves in situations in which their actions are being shaped by immoral
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systems and structures. Some researchers call for a renewed focus on social work practitioners
exercising moral courage (Fenton 2016), engaging in moral action (Keinemans and Kanne 2013),
and using both covert and overt strategies in responding to moral injustices (Fine and Teram
2013). In addition to being a sensitizing construct for injustice, awareness of and understanding
of moral suffering can spark a call to action for individual social workers and social work as a
field to engage in the necessary systemic, structural, and political work required to promote
social justice.
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Table 1: Comparison of the Research Contexts, Characteristics, and Effects of Moral Injury, Moral Distress, and
Demoralization

Impact
Construct

Primary Context
of Research

Role of the
Individual in the
Moral
Transgression
Perpetrator;
witness; victim

Moral injury

Military

Moral distress

Nursing

Perpetrator

Demoralization

Healthcare
professionals;
teachers

Perpetrator;
witness

Characteristics of the Morally
Transgressive Activity

Psychologica
l/
Emotional

Existential

Social

Individual commits a moral
transgression either
intentionally, accidentally, or
because they feel they have no
other choice; individual may or
may not be fully aware of the
immorality of the action prior to
it being carried out
Individual knows what the
moral choice is, but chooses
the immoral choice due to
internal or external constraints
on their actions; individual
experiences moral uncertainty
about the right action to take
Individual is impotent; unable to
act in a way that is morally
congruent with his/her beliefs
and expectations, usually due
to structural/systemic
constraints

Anxiety,
depression,
anger, shame,
guilt

Loss of trust in
self and others;
breakdown in
global meaning

Social withdrawal

Anxiety,
depression,
frustration,
anger, shame,
guilt,
powerlessness

Threat to sense
of self

Distancing from patients;
leaving the profession

Helplessness,
hopelessness,
anxiety,
depression,
shame

Threat to sense
of self; lack of
meaning to the
world

Leaving the profession
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Figure 1: A Conceptual Model of Moral Suffering
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